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‘NOT STARTING IN SIXTH GEAR': 
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT’S USE OF SOFT 
LAW AS A GLOBAL GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE FOR CORPORATE 
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
By Roya Ghafele* and Angus Mercer** 
ABSTRACT 
The practical difficulties with employing hard law at an international 
level have resulted in softer codes of conduct stepping in to fill the void. The 
United Nations Global Compact is amongst the most ambitious of these 
codes, created with a desire to engage businesses in corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) initiatives.  Soft law regulatory instruments, such as 
voluntary standards and framework agreements, have been routinely 
criticized for the vagueness and subjectivity of the commitments they elicit 
from their participants. However, what appears to be lacking in the existing 
literature is a critical analysis of such commitments. Through examining the 
use of soft law by the Compact, we argue that although many question or 
even dismiss its non-binding approach, it provides an illustrative example of 
the benefits of soft law over harder forms of regulation.  The use of soft law 
as a global governance structure should not be dismissed as a ‘Plan B’ in 
the event that harder law is not practical. Clear benefits exist in starting an 
international regulatory mechanism at the softer end of the ‘legalization 
spectrum’ before toughening up later on. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION: THE RISE OF THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION ............ 42 
I. THE LEGALIZATION SPECTRUM: FROM SOFT LAW TO HARD LAW ........ 44 
II. THE GLOBAL COMPACT AND ITS CRITICS .............................................. 46 
                                                          
 * Roya Ghafele holds a lectureship with the University of Oxford’s Department of 
International Development, Queen Elizabeth House, 3 Mansfield Road, Oxford OX13TB. 
Email: roya.ghafele@qeh.ox.ac.uk 
 ** Angus Mercer works for an international law firm in London. He received his Master’s 
Degree in Global Governance and Diplomacy from the University of Oxford’s Department of 
International Development, Queen Elizabeth House, 3 Mansfield Road, Oxford OX13TB. 
Email: angus.mercer@gmail.com 
We would like to thank Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal for their valuable comments on 
this article.  
GHAFELE - CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY - MACRO.DOCX 6/27/2011  12:35 PM 
42 University of California, Davis [Vol. 17:1 
III. ASSESSING THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF SOFT LAW BY THE 
GLOBAL COMPACT ................................................................................. 48 
A. Obligation: The Compact’s ‘Carrots and Sticks’ Approach ........... 49 
1. The Carrots ............................................................................... 49 
2. The Sticks ................................................................................. 50 
B. Precision: The Compact’s Best Practice & Engagement 
Opportunities .................................................................................. 53 
C. Delegation ....................................................................................... 58 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 59 
INTRODUCTION: THE RISE OF THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION 
“Transnational corporations are increasing their influence over the 
economic, political and cultural life of humanity whilst remaining almost 
completely unaccountable to global civil society.”1  
 
The rising influence of multinational corporations is now widely 
accepted in contemporary international law and public policy scholarship.2 
As James Rosenau observed twenty years ago, “[t]he very notion of 
international relations seems obsolete in the face of an apparent trend in 
which more and more of the interactions that sustain world politics unfold 
without the direct involvement of nations or states.”3 Multinationals have 
emerged as one of the most powerful actors in a new global civil society; 
arguably the biggest beneficiary of a post-Cold War reconstitution of the 
global public domain. Along with international nongovernmental 
organizations and other increasingly powerful non-state actors, big 
businesses now vie for power on the international stage, a development 
which has led many scholars to abandon more traditional state-centric 
perspectives.4 By the turn of the last century, multinationals accounted for 
51 of the largest 100 economic entities in the world, and a quarter of global 
output.5 Given this enormous resource capacity, it is hardly surprising that 
some scholars have started to view multinationals as an emerging type of 
                                                          
 1 Morton Winston, NGO Strategies for Promoting Corporate Social Responsibility, 16 
ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 71, 75-76 (2002).  
 2 See, e.g., Sarah Anderson & John Cavanagh, Top 200: The Rise of Corporate Global 
Power, GLOBAL POLICY FORUM (2000) available at: http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/ 
tncs/top200.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2011). 
 3 JAMES N. ROSENAU, TURBULENCE IN WORLD POLITICS: A THEORY OF CHANGE AND 
CONTINUITY 6 (Princeton University Press) (1990). 
 4 Stefan Fritsch, The UN Global Compact and the Global Governance of Corporate 
Social Responsibility: Complex Multilateralism for a More Human Globalisation?, 22 
GLOBAL SOC’Y  1, 22 (2008). 
 5 Anderson & Cavanagh, supra note 2. 
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“private authority” with the capability of usurping roles traditionally 
associated with the state.6  
The importance of regulating companies through global Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives is difficult to overstate. Businesses 
have the capacity to both benefit and cause great harm to their surrounding 
environment. Renowned global governance theorist Andrew Kuper argues 
that “[a]n outlook that ignores corporations . . . strikes most informed 
commentators as fiddling while Rome burns.”7 The specific resources and 
competencies of large-scale companies must be harnessed to ensure cheap 
and efficient delivery of socially beneficial services.  
CSR initiatives have risen to prominence because of a growing 
discrepancy between the social costs caused by companies and the 
comparably limited scrutiny they face in dealing with those costs.8 The 
concept of CSR is amorphous, with definitions ranging from mere corporate 
compliance with legal obligations to those involving active and voluntary 
engagement in socially beneficial behavior.9 Whichever definition one 
chooses to employ, it is clear that the growing influence of companies at an 
international level has triggered heightened societal expectations of 
corporate behavior. There is, in short, a growing sense that businesses need 
to accept greater responsibility for their actions.10 
In light of these heightened expectations, how can multinational 
corporations be held to account? How can their unrivalled global capacity be 
harnessed and utilized in the most effective way possible? In other words, 
how can we develop global governance structures that are relevant to the 
new economic realities of our times?  
In this article, we state the case for the unique role that soft law 
mechanisms can play in the regulation of large corporations. Soft law 
instruments, such as voluntary standards and framework agreements, have 
been roundly criticized for the vagueness and subjectivity of the 
commitments they elicit from their participants.11 However, the existing 
                                                          
 6 Ann Florini, Business and Global Governance: The Growing Role of Corporate Codes 
of Conduct, BROOKINGS REV., Vol. 21, Spring 2003. See also PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND 
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (A. Claire Cutler et al. eds., 1999); THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE 
AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Rodney B. Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker eds., 2002). 
 7 Andrew Kuper, Harnessing Corporate Power: Lessons from the U.N. Global Compact, 
47 SOC’Y FOR INT’L DEV. 9, 10 (2004). 
 8 Florini, supra note 6. 
 9  Lisa Whitehouse, Corporate Social Responsibility, Corporate Citizenship and the 
Global Compact: A New Approach to Regulating Corporate Social Power?, 3 GLOBAL SOC. 
POL’Y 299, 303- 304; DOW VOTAW & S. PRAKASH SETHI, THE CORPORATE DILEMMA: 
TRADITIONAL VALUES AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 11 (1973). 
 10 Fritsch, supra note 4, at 7. 
 11 John King Gamble Jr., The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as 
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literature lacks a critical analysis of such commitments. We have attempted 
to bridge this gap by analyzing the norms generated by the United Nations 
Global Compact (“Compact”), through a framework capable of both 
assessing the initiative’s merits and weaknesses and tracing its development. 
We argue that, although many question or dismiss its non-binding 
approach,12 the Compact provides an illustrative example of the benefits of 
soft law over harder forms of regulation.  
I. THE LEGALIZATION SPECTRUM: FROM SOFT LAW TO HARD LAW 
It is important to define the most basic concepts of soft and hard law at 
the outset.  Hard law has been defined as “norms creating precise legal rights 
and obligations.”13 Soft law, by contrast, consists of rules which are not 
legally binding, but which still intend to produce changes in behavior from 
those it regulates.14 No binary choice exists between soft and hard law; it is 
better to regard these two forms of legalization as ideal types sitting at 
opposite ends of a “continuum with numerous graduations.”15 We shall be 
referring to this continuum as the “legalization spectrum.” 
What factors determine the “softness” or “hardness’ of a rule? In their 
seminal article, Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal suggest that rules can be 
broken down into three different dimensions: “obligation,” “precision,” and 
“delegation.”16 “Obligation” simply refers to the extent to which actors are 
legally bound by the rule in question. Prototypical soft law does not confer 
binding legal obligations, unlike its hard law counterpart.17  “Precision” 
refers to the detail in which the rule governing the actor in question is set 
out, both in terms of the objective and the method by which to achieve it.18 
In this respect, soft law is identifiable by the deliberately vague nature of the 
obligations imposed19 and the consequent discretion left to the parties being 
                                                          
Soft Law, 8 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 37 (1985). 
 12 Jonathan Cohen, The World’s Business: The United Nations and the Globalisation of 
Corporate Citizenship, in PERSPECTIVES ON CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP 196 (Jorg Andriof & 
Malcolm McIntosh eds., Greenleaf Publishing 2001); Maureen A. Kilgour, The UN Global 
Compact and Substantive Equality for Women: revealing a ‘well hidden’ mandate, 28 THIRD 
WORLD Q. 751, 773 (2007); Fritsch, supra note 4. 
 13 Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law? 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 
413, 414 (1983). 
 14 Snyder, F. ‘Soft Law and Institutional Practise in the European Community’, European 
University Institute Working Paper, Law No. 93/5: 2 (1993). 
 15 Gamble, supra note 11, at 38. 
 16 Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 
54 INT’L ORG. 421, 456 (2000). 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Joseph Gold, Strengthening the Soft Law of Exchange Arrangements, 77 AM. J. INT’L 
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regulated.20 By contrast, hard law is precise, clear and unambiguous.21 
Finally, “delegation” refers firstly to the degree to which third parties have 
been assigned the responsibilities of interpreting, implementing and applying 
the rule. It also refers to the degree to which such parties have been assigned 
the responsibility for resolving disputes relating to the rule.22 The degree of 
enforcement plays a crucial role in determining the degree of “delegation.”23 
Under this framework, each of the three dimensions of legalization has 
its own continuous sliding scale. The higher a rule scores across the three 
dimensions, the “harder” it is, hence the higher it will sit on the overall 
legalization spectrum.24 Given the myriad different types of rules and 
regulations employed throughout the international arena25 and the diverse 
range of institutions which can generate them, it is impossible to identify any 
such universally applicable threshold with any kind of certainty. 
Nevertheless, rules and regulations can be placed accurately at a certain 
point along each of the three sliding scales (obligation, precision and 
delegation) as well as on the overall legalization spectrum (see diagram 
below). 
                                                          
L. 443 (1983). 
 20 Tadeusz Gruchalla-Wesierski, A Framework for Understanding Soft Law, 30 MCGILL 
L.J. 37 (1984). 
 21 Abbott & Snidal, supra note 16, at 421.  
 22 Id. at 421-56. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. at 426-34. 
 25 C. M. Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International 
Law 38 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 850, 851 (1989).  
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The arrow emphasizes that any perception of a soft law/ hard law 
dichotomy is illusory and misguided. It also underlines the continuous nature 
of the legalization spectrum- a regulation can be placed at any point along 
the arrow according to how it scores across the three dimensions. For the 
purposes of this article, the spectrum also illustrates the transition made by 
the norms generated by the Compact. As we shall demonstrate, the Compact 
shifted from generating almost prototypical soft law at its inception to 
generating rules occupying a progressively more moderate position on the 
overall legalization spectrum.  
II. THE GLOBAL COMPACT AND ITS CRITICS 
The practical impossibility of employing hard law at an international 
level has meant that softer codes of conduct have stepped in to fill the void. 
We chose the Compact as a case study because it constitutes the single most 
ambitious international code for the governance of CSR. Other codes, such 
as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (1976, revised in 2000), the Caux 
Round Table Principles (1994) or the WHO/UNICEF code for transnational 
corporations have failed to achieve the same degree of internationalization.26  
The Compact is a strategic policy initiative whereby corporate 
participants are required to “embrace, support and enact” ten principles in 
the areas of human rights, labor, the environment and anti-corruption.27 The 
initiative reflects an eagerness on the part of the U.N. to engage businesses 
in international development, and serves as a good example of the recent 
“pendulum swing away from stricter forms of regulation” at the international 
level.28 The Compact’s mandate was recently reaffirmed by a new U.N. 
General Assembly Resolution,29 and it employs soft (but, as we shall 
demonstrate, increasingly more moderate) forms of legalization to “leverage 
the platform” of large corporations30 and encourage socially responsible 
corporate behavior.  
                                                          
 26 Org. Econ. Coop. Dev., THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 
(2009); Caux Roundtable, CRT Principles for Responsible Business (2009); Kathryn Sikkink, 
Codes of Conduct for Transnational Corporations: the Case of the WHO/UNICEF Code, 40 
INT’L ORG. 815, 815-840 (1986).  
 27 United Nations Global Compact, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/The 
TenPrinciples/index.html (Last visited Dec. 5, 2010). 
 28  Peter Utting, Business Responsibility for Sustainable Development, 2 UNITED NATIONS 
RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OCCASIONAL PAPER 1, 29 
(2000).  
 29  G.A. Rev. 1, U.N. GAOR, 62nd Sess., Agenda Item 61, U.N. Doc. A/C. 2/62, at (Dec. 
3, 2007).  
 30 John Gerard Ruggie, Reconstituting the Global Public Domain – Issues, Actors, and 
Practices, 10 EUR. J. INT’L RELAT., 499, 515 (2004). 
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The initiative operates on a purely voluntary basis. Companies 
participate simply by completing an online form and sending a letter of 
commitment to the U.N. Secretary-General expressing their desire to 
participate.31 The Compact relies on “public accountability, transparency 
and the enlightened self-interest of companies, labor and civil society to 
initiate and share substantive action in pursuing the principles upon which 
[it] is based.”32 The ten fundamental principles serve as “macro contracts” 
defining the responsibilities of the participant companies, while at a micro-
level, local networks develop between participating firms and other 
stakeholders such as 
NGOs, academia and labor associations.33 The principles are based on 
existing norms espoused in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
International Labor Organization’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 
and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption respectively.34 
The Compact has no shortage of critics. Its inability to legally enforce 
companies’ implementation of its ten principles is viewed by many as a fatal 
weakness.35 It has been strongly criticized for not demanding a higher 
degree of accountability from its corporate participants36 and for lacking the 
ability to sanction those failing to live up to their commitments.37 Put 
another way, its critics complain that “[i]ndividual and collaborative 
initiatives continue to be dominated by self-assertion rather than 
accountability.”38 They argue that companies can only be made accountable 
through legally enforceable obligations, and that softer forms of legalization, 
such as voluntary CSR initiatives, are “no substitute for the legislative 
actions of a recognized political authority”39 given the lack of any basis for 
                                                          
 31 Business Participation, United Nations Global Compact, available at http://www. 
unglobalcompact.org/HowToParticipate/Business_Participation/index.html (last visited Nov. 
13, 2010). 
 32  ROGER BLANPAIN & MICHELE COLUCCI, THE GLOBALIZATION OF LABOUR 
STANDARDS: THE SOFT LAW TRACK 41 (2004). 
 33 Dirk Ulrich Gilbert & Andreas Rasche, Opportunities and Problems of Standardized 
Ethics Initiatives – a Stakeholder Theory Perspective, 82 J. BUS. ETHICS 755, 758-759 (2008). 
 34 United Nations Global Compact, supra note 27. 
 35 Cohen, supra note 12, at 196. 
 36 Haider Rizvi, UN Pact with Business Lacks Accountability, INTER PRESS SERVICE, June 
24, 2004, http://www.globalpolicy.org/reform/business/2004/0624lack.htm; Kilgour, supra 
note 12, at  768. 
 37 Fritsch, supra note 4, at 22. 
 38 Aruna Das Gupta, Social Responsibility in India: Towards Global Compact Approach, 
34 INT’L J. SOC. ECON. 637, 655 (2007). 
 39 Steven Hughes et al., The Global Compact: Promoting Corporate Responsibility?, 10 
ENVIRON. POL. 155, 157 (2001). 
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legal claims or redress under such initiatives.40 As evidence, such critics 
point to the mere issuance of a “statement of concern”41 following the major 
oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in early 2010 by the oil giant BP, a Compact 
member since 2000.42 The Compact’s seventh principle states that 
“businesses should support a precautionary approach to environmental 
challenges.”43 In the face of such a flagrant breach of this principle, it is 
certainly arguable that the Compact should have done a great deal more to 
censure the company.   
Critics tend to further dismiss the Compact as a public relations 
gimmick,44 an example of companies lobbying for “business friendly (sic) 
pseudo-solutions” to the social costs they create, instead of enforceable 
rules.45 They call for binding rules to replace the voluntary approach,46 and 
pressure the U.N. to “have its own system of complaints and adjudications, 
which could conduct investigations to a standard that would have legal 
standing.”47  
III. ASSESSING THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF SOFT LAW BY THE GLOBAL 
COMPACT 
It is clear from such criticism that soft law governance initiatives like 
the Compact have their limitations. However, in failing to acknowledge the 
advantages of voluntary, non-binding regulations that they generate, many 
critics leap to the easy and intellectually lazy assumption that hard law 
                                                          
 40 James A. Paul & Jason Garred, Making Corporations Accountable: A Background 
Paper for the United Nations Financing for Development Process, GLOBAL POL’Y FORUM 
(December 2005), available at:://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/ffd/2000papr.htm (last visited 
Jan. 11, 2011). 
 41 Global Compact Critics, ‘Global Compact on BP: “Big Accidents Happen All the 
Time” (2010) available at: http://globalcompactcritics.blogspot.com/2010/06/global-compact-
on-bp-big-accidents.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2011). 
 42 David Scheffer, BP Shows the Need for a Rethink of Regulation, FINANCIAL TIMES 
(May 27, 2010), available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/919f37fe-69c1-11df-8432-00144 
feab49a.html#axzz159EXLhRF (last visited Jan. 11, 2011).  
 43 United Nations Global Compact, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/The 
TenPrinciples/index.html (Last visited Nov. 13, 2010). 
 44 See Winston, supra note 1; Anke Hassel, The Evolution of a Global Labor Governance 
Regime, 21 GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L J. OF POL’Y, ADMINISTRATION, & INSTITUTIONS. 231, 
234 (2008). 
 45 Olivier Hoedeman, Rio +10 and the Greenwash of Corporate Globalization, 45 DEV. 
39, 40 (2002). 
 46 See, e.g., Amnesty International, Letter to Louise Frèchette raising concerns on U.N. 
Global Compact, GLOBAL POLICY FORUM (Apr. 7, 2003), http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos 
/ngo-un/access/2003/0606compact.htm. 
 47 Jem Bendell, Flags of Inconvenience? The Global Compact and the Future of the 
United Nations, ICCSR Research Paper Series (Nottingham U. Bus. Sch.), 2004, at 12. 
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trumps soft law in every conceivable context. Voluntary initiatives like the 
Compact compensate for their lack of binding authority in a variety of 
different ways. We now examine these mechanisms using the legalization 
spectrum as our analytical framework.  
A. Obligation: The Compact’s ‘Carrots and Sticks’ Approach 
From the very beginning, the Compact faced the difficult challenge of 
generating meaningful and effective CSR regulations without being able to 
legally enforce them.48 Consequently, it became imperative that the initiative 
made it in the interest of its profit-driven corporate participants to live up to 
their commitments. As a soft law initiative, it has a variety of carrots and 
sticks at its disposal to help it achieve this. The “carrot” approaches involve 
selling the advantages of its voluntary, flexible status to its participants. The 
“stick” approaches involve sanctioning non-complying, free-riding 
companies by undermining their reputation. As we will now demonstrate, 
the “carrots” were employed from the very outset to secure broad 
participation in the Compact. It was only once this had been achieved that 
the “sticks” were progressively ratcheted up to preserve the integrity of the 
initiative. 
1. The Carrots 
One major carrot offered by the Compact to participating companies is 
autonomy regarding the way in which they implement the ten principles. 
The Compact also provides interactive forums in which its participants can 
facilitate dialogue and promote the sharing of CSR strategies.49 However, 
the biggest carrot of all is membership of the Compact itself - corporations 
can enhance the value of their brand by associating themselves with the 
initiative and, by extension, with the United Nations.  
By allowing regulated companies to retain autonomy over how they 
choose to incorporate the ten principles into their everyday practices, the 
Compact does not alienate potential participants. Most scholars believe that 
corporations quite simply would not sign up to the Compact if a legal 
obligation was imposed, and there is evidence to support this theory. 50 The 
                                                          
 48 See Georg Kell, The Global Compact: Selected Experiences and Reflections, 59 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 69, 72 (2005). 
 49 See Jean-Philippe Therien & Vincent Pouliot, The Global Compact: Shifting the 
Politics of International Development?, 12 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: A REV. OF 
MULTILATERALISM AND INT’L ORGS. 55, 55-75 (2006). 
 50 Lauren A. Mowery, Earth Rights, Human Rights: Can International Environmental 
Human Rights Affect Corporate Accountability?, 13 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 343 (2002). See 
also Kuper, supra note 7, at 11. 
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binding nature of the “Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regards to Human 
Rights,” introduced in 2003 by the U.N. Human Rights Commission, meant 
that this initiative met with firm resistance from most businesses and its 
development was inhibited as a result.51 The danger of imposing forms of 
legalization that score too high on the “obligation” dimension was also 
highlighted by the unwillingness of developed states to participate in the 
legally binding “Principle of Non-Reciprocal Preferential Treatment of 
Developing States” in the 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of 
States.52 Companies, like states, prefer their activities not to be subject to the 
decisions of an external force. The Compact appears to have internalized this 
message; it prioritized high participation over enforcement integrity until 
enough companies were signed up. Only then did it toughen its stance by 
imposing progressively more advanced and onerous “stick” tactics, to which 
we now turn.53 
2. The Sticks 
The Compact did employ some measure of coercion from the outset. 
However, this was initially limited to the monitoring of company behavior 
by NGOs and the media, coupled with the subsequent imposition of 
reputational sanctions for socially irresponsible practices. Political scholars 
Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink suggest that activist organizations 
employ a variety of tactics designed to hold the actors they scrutinize to 
account. These tactics apply equally to voluntary standards initiatives like 
the Compact, and include strategies such as “leverage politics.”54 This 
practice involves the “mobilization of shame,” where “the behavior of target 
actors is held up to the bright light of international scrutiny.”55 The 
effectiveness of such a strategy lies in employing what leading foreign 
policy expert Joseph Nye sees as a classic feature of “soft power”- that is, 
using the “hard power” of another actor (in this case, a company’s high 
"brand equity”) against it as a means to obtain a desired outcome.56 As legal 
theorist Andre Guzman notes, when a state signs up to a voluntary 
agreement, it offers its “reputation for living up to its commitments as a 
form of collateral,” where “failure to live up to one’s commitments harms 
                                                          
 51 Fritsch, supra note 4, at 25-26. 
 52 Gruchalla-Wesierski, supra note 18, at 41. 
 53 Hassel, supra note 39, at 245. 
 54 Margaret E. Keck & Kathryn Sikkink, Transnational Advocacy Networks in 
International and Regional Politics, 51 Int’l Soc. Sci. J.89, 97 (Mar. 1999). 
 55 Id. 
 56 Joseph Nye, Lecture at Oxford University: Hard and Soft Power in International 
Governance (May 25, 2009). 
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ones reputation and makes future commitments less credible.”57 We submit 
that this principle applies to an even greater extent to large companies, given 
the enormous value and investment placed in their corporate image. 
Naming and shaming is a highly effective strategy, and the voluntary 
instrument known as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) 
is an excellent example of its success in practice. Set up by the UK-based 
NGO “Global Witness,” the EITI sets an international standard for 
companies in the extractive sector to publish the revenues they pay to 
governments for oil, gas and mining contracts. Despite its purely voluntary 
status, the EITI has been an enormous success story. 50 of the world’s 
extractive-industry companies support and actively participate in the EITI,58 
while 28 countries have applied to become EITI compliant.59 Why are 
resource-rich developing countries bending over backwards to comply with 
a voluntary standard created by small Western NGO? Oxford University 
economist Professor Paul Collier suggests that it is because the EITI “sorts 
the sheep out from the goats . . . [t]he decent governments sign up, and that 
then reveals the ones that refused to sign up as just what they are.”60  
Professor Collier argues in his recent book The Bottom Billion that “[n]orms 
are effective because they are enforced by peer pressure . . . [a]n 
international charter gives people something very concrete to demand: either 
the government adopts it or it must explain why it hasn’t.”61 The same can 
be said of the Compact, except we replace the word “government” with 
“corporation.” The beauty of the concept is that it costs next to nothing to 
implement; it simply relies on the scrutiny of advocacy networks that are 
already in place, and the desire of the actors regulated to be seen as good 
global citizens.  
As the Compact has developed, its mechanisms for inflicting 
reputational sanctions on its non-complying participants have become 
progressively more onerous. The Compact’s initial refusal to publicly shame 
those failing to file annual progress reports was seen as a major weakness.62 
However, now that it has attracted a plethora of participants, the initiative 
has toughened its stance; as part of the 2005 reforms, the Compact 
introduced “Integrity Measures.” These state that any company failing to 
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report its progress annually will be labeled publicly as “non-communicating” 
on the Compact’s website. 63 A company will be de-listed from the initiative 
if this failure is repeated the following year.64 The Financial Times reports 
that in 2010, 55 companies were delisted for their failure to provide a 
communication on progress.65 
To strengthen these reforms further, a more detailed and transparent 
system for reviewing complaints has been put into place.66 Initially, the 
Compact adopted a “softly-softly” approach: it forwarded substantiated 
complaints to the company concerned and merely requested information on 
the company’s plans to rectify the situation, occasionally providing guidance 
to assist the company in this process.67 However, failure on the part of the 
company to enter into dialogue now results in the company being labeled 
“inactive” or even being removed from the list of Compact participants.68 
The 2005 reforms have been praised for allowing “the possibility of filing 
complaints of systematic or egregious abuse of the Compact’s overall aims 
and principles to the Global Compact Office against any participating 
company.”69 This toughened complaints procedure works primarily because 
it is largely self-regulating; it is in the interests of both the Compact and 
rival companies to see an offending participant held to account for its 
violations. Other firms lose out when their competitors succeed in evading 
their responsibilities.70   
Finally, since 2005 the “Policy on the Use of the Compact Name and 
Logos” has provided “specific and detailed examples of circumstances under 
which . . . the display of the logos will be generally permitted.”71 Prior to 
this, the Compact was strongly criticized for allowing participating 
companies to “blue-wash” their socially irresponsible activities through their 
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association with the initiative- i.e. “wrapping themselves in the flag of the 
United Nations”72 without taking any substantial steps to improve their 
behavior. For example, the U.N. and its former Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan were heavily criticized for showing “poor judgment in allowing 
executives such as Nike’s Phil Knight to be photographed with Mr. Annan in 
front of the U.N. flag, without any substantial effort by the company to 
adhere to the Global Compact principles.”73 Since the 2005 reforms, 
however, the Compact has significantly strengthened the coercive pressure it 
applies.  
Given the more stringent mechanisms for inflicting reputation sanctions 
outlined above, we argue that the Compact’s norms have shifted from a low 
position to a moderate position on the sliding scale of “obligation.”  
B. Precision: The Compact’s Best Practice & Engagement Opportunities 
Although the Compact has specified its intended objectives in its ten 
governing principles, these are set out in extremely vague, one-sentence 
terms. Initially, the means by which companies were supposed to achieve 
these goals were not articulated. The second principle, for example, states 
that businesses should “make sure that they are not complicit in any human 
rights abuses.”74 However, the Compact in no way makes it explicit how this 
principle should be translated into practice. Unsurprisingly, the Compact has 
been heavily criticized for failing to define the obligations of its participants 
in a more detailed manner.75 Such critics view low “precision” scores as a 
clear weakness undermining the Compact’s overarching aim to get 
companies to embrace their core values.76 They see voluntary codes as 
frequently amounting to little more than “vague statements of principle that 
cannot provide reliable guidelines for behavior in concrete situations.”77 
                                                          
 72 Transnational Action and Resource Center, Tangled Up In Blue: Corporate 
Partnerships at the United Nations, available at: http://s3.amazonaws.com/corpwatch.org 
/downloads/tangled.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2011). 
 73 Kenny Bruno & Joshua Karliner, The U.N.’s Global Compact, Corporate 
Accountability and the Johannesburg Earth Summit, 45 Society for International 
Development. 33-38 (2002). 
 74 Global Compact, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/aboutthegc/index.html. (last visited 
Dec. 3, 2010). 
 75 Daniel Litvin, The FP Memo: A Strategy for Business and Human Rights, Raising 
Human Rights Standards in the Private Sector, Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy. 
com/articles/2003/11/01/a_strategy_for_business_and_human_rights (last visited Nov. 18, 
2010). 
 76 Litvin, supra note 57. 
 77 Paul & Garred, supra note 35; Litvin, supra note 57; Elisa Morgera, The U.N. and 
Corporate Environmental Responsibility: Between International Regulation and Partnerships, 
15 Rev. Eur. Cmty. & Int’l Envtl. L. 93, 100 (Apr. 2006). 
GHAFELE - CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY - MACRO.DOCX 6/27/2011  12:35 PM 
54 University of California, Davis [Vol. 17:1 
Such criticisms miss something important: these ten one-sentence 
principles are intended merely as a starting point. Detailed ideas for further 
CSR projects may be incrementally developed, since the use of soft law 
means that the more formal, bureaucratic policy instruments of hard law 
initiatives are avoided.78 A parallel may be drawn to the discretion available 
to the signatories of the European Union’s Stability and Growth Pact, where 
“scope for reform without resort to formal legal changes is possible and 
more likely than if formal legal instruments . . . had to be reformed.”79 As 
Georg Kell, Executive Director of the Compact, pointed out: “[t]he rapid 
evolution of the Compact stands in stark contrast to the cumbersome task of 
establishing regulation, and highlights the advantage of voluntary initiatives' 
flexibility.”80 Given that the Compact is only ten years old and arguably still 
in its embryonic stages, it seems logical for the initiative to limit the degree 
of rigid ex ante legislation it produces, and instead to develop progressively 
more precise and detailed norms through dialogue between its participants 
that is free of “command and control.”81 This is where the Compact’s 
function as an interactive forum for discussion and learning plays such an 
important role. At the Compact’s inception, it was imperative not to alienate 
businesses through legally binding mechanisms, but rather to generate 
progressively more detailed ideas for socially responsible behavior with 
them as willing, engaged parties to the process. 
Thus, it is important not to neglect the fact that the Compact’s much-
maligned “vagueness” actually presents significant advantages. The low 
“precision” score of the Compact’s ten principles encourages widespread 
corporate participation in the initiative.  Rather than alienate companies by 
scaring them away with detailed rules, the Compact gives them the 
autonomy to implement its principles in different ways, according to what 
works best in their industry and in the jurisdiction in which they operate. 
Comparisons can be made with the Open Method of Coordination 
governance system (OMC) operating within the European Union, which also 
allows for the flexible adaptation of policy initiatives according to the 
“diverse institutional arrangements, legal regimes and national 
circumstances in the member states.”82 The Compact shares the desire of the 
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OMC to strike a balance between respecting the diversity of its participants, 
whilst retaining the advantages of collective action.83   
The Compact’s soft law instruments provide a variety of interactive 
platforms for participating companies to discuss and learn about CSR 
policies collectively.84 The consultancy group McKinsey’s analysis of 
participant companies’ motivations for signing up to the Compact revealed 
that, after the purpose of addressing humanitarian concerns, the three most 
important motivations companies most frequently cited were: (1) the 
acquisition of practical know-how, (2) the opportunity to network with other 
organizations, and (3) to become more familiar with CSR practices.85 The 
most attractive feature of the Compact for its participants therefore seems to 
be the opportunity to engage in cooperative dialogue with other civil society 
actors (including other companies) and thereby learn about how they can 
best improve their CSR activities. These so-called “engagement 
opportunities” provided by the Compact fall into three principal categories.86  
Firstly, the Compact has a system of “Learning Networks.”87 These are 
designed to “facilitate the progress of companies . . . with respect to 
implementation of the ten principles, while also creating opportunities for 
multi-stakeholder engagement and collective action.”88  The aim is to foster 
an environment in which companies are able to engage in a mutually 
beneficial information exchange.89 An Annual Local Networks Forum is 
held every year to enable further networking and learning opportunities.90 
Secondly, the Compact organizes “Policy Dialogues,” meetings which allow 
for “intensified exchange of ideas” between businesses, government leaders, 
U.N. agencies, NGOs, academics and other actors. 91 Such dialogues “focus 
on specific issues relating to globalization and corporate citizenship”; past 
topics have included “The Role of the Private Sector in Zones of Conflict” 
and “Business and Sustainable Development.”92 From these Policy 
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Dialogues, case studies of successful best practices can be sent to the Global 
Compact Office. 93 Finally, the Compact uses its website as repository of 
information.94 In addition to providing their mandatory annual 
“Communication on Progress,” companies can also submit “case stories” 
detailing specific actions they have taken to further their CSR 
commitments.95 There is a large public relations incentive for companies to 
deliver a detailed account of the improvements they have been making in 
their CSR practices; the Compact’s “Notable Program” rewards outstanding 
Communications on Progress by publishing them in a special section on its 
website.96 
The principle advantage presented by the learning environment fostered 
through soft law mechanisms is that it provides scope for the “precision” 
score of the norms generated to be progressively increased as detailed, 
universally agreed upon norms and standards of practice are generated by 
the participants.97 In this regard, the Compact may again be compared with 
the OMC governance system, for which “[t]he objective is not to prescribe 
uniform rules,” but to organize “a learning process in order to promote the 
exchange of experiences and best practices.”98 The creation of any detailed 
best practices would almost certainly be impossible to achieve through a 
hard law initiative, given the reluctance of companies to bind themselves to 
precise legal obligations.  
As companies progressively acquire experience in the field of CSR and 
disseminate this information through the channels that the Compact has put 
in place, ideas, and standards evolve. As internationally-renowned political 
scientist Ann Florini notes with respect to the Compact, “[t]he dispute over 
exactly what . . . standards should be - and who should decide - has just 
begun.”99 Corporate strategies, structures, and production processes are 
subject to constant and fast-paced change; it therefore makes sense to have a 
malleable, adaptable body of knowledge which can be added to as new 
norms are generated, rather than a rigid system of legally binding 
legislation.100 The latter system would quickly become obsolete as the 
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principles it espoused became dated and redundant. The same philosophy 
lies behind the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, the 
framework accompanying the 1987 Montreal Protocol which was commonly 
recognized as one of the most successful international agreements in recent 
history.101 The obligations within the Convention were set out in imprecise 
terms to begin with, allowing “flexibility and protection for states to work 
out problems over time through negotiations shaped by normative 
guidelines, rather than constrained by precise rules.”102 Similarly, the 
flexible nature of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade has been 
praised, given the difficulty in imposing precise a priori rules considering 
the “realities of incomplete information about future economic shocks.”103 
The Compact therefore adopts the more realistic strategy of attempting to 
generate consensus around initially vague but progressively more precise 
soft law norms. 
As multi-stakeholder dialogue continues to become more sophisticated 
and as managers become more aware of the needs of their constituencies, the 
hope is that different, industry-specific behavioral norms will emerge in a 
“bottom-up” fashion104 and will become embedded within the culture of that 
particular industry and that a “plethora of voluntarist initiatives [will] 
converge over time on a shared understanding.”105 Importantly, the norms 
generated through such a process will enjoy a great deal of legitimacy and 
could eventually harden into more formal legal codes.106 Take the EITI 
initiative discussed earlier in this article- the voluntary standards it set for 
companies very recently been used as the template on which binding 
legislation in the United States is now based.107 This year’s much-publicized 
Dodd-Frank financial reform legislation108 contains a rule, based on EITI 
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voluntary principles, which “will force US-listed companies to publish 
details of taxes, royalties and other fees they pay in the countries where they 
operate.”109 This is a perfect example of how harder forms of regulation can 
evolve from voluntary standards initiatives like the EITI and the Compact.  
The Compact’s norms on the “precision” scale have moved, therefore, 
from an initial position where it was extremely difficult to identify what 
conduct did or did not constitute compliance with Compact principles, given 
their vagueness and the initial lack of guidelines, to a position where detailed 
standards have developed in a number of different fields.110 We therefore 
argue that the evolution of these non-binding norms shifts them from a low 
to a moderate “precision” score.  
C. Delegation 
As we noted earlier, the “delegation” dimension may be subdivided into 
two components. It refers firstly to the degree to which third parties have 
been delegated the responsibilities of interpreting, implementing, and 
applying the rules. It refers secondly to the degree to which such parties 
have been delegated the responsibility for resolving disputes. 
The Compact delegates very little dispute resolution authority to third 
parties. The only mechanism that even approaches such a delegation is the 
option for the Compact to initiate legal proceedings against a company in the 
event of a misuse of its name of logo.111 Moreover, this provision is 
articulated in extremely vague terms.112 As a result, it is difficult to give the 
Compact’s norms anything other than a very low score for the first 
component of the “delegation” dimension.  
On the second component, however, the Compact’s the norms score 
higher. This “rule-making and implementation” component consists of a 
sliding scale running from softest forms of legalization that constitute 
“negotiations forums” to the hardest forms which consist of “binding 
regulations” with “centralized enforcement.”113 We argue that the external 
“engagement opportunities” provided by the Compact are no longer mere 
“negotiations forums,” but have evolved into providing “coordination 
standards” (in the middle of the sliding scale) to companies in the form of 
best practices.114 Additionally, we have shown that in carrying out their 
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“naming and shaming” function, advocacy networks such as NGOs and the 
media have been delegated a role of “monitoring and publicity” (also 
positioned in the middle of the scale) to ensure corporate compliance with 
the Compact’s ten principles. 
In this context, it is important to highlight the value of the “spotlight 
effect,” in keeping Compact participants honest.115 Keck and Sikkink note 
that, once companies have publicly committed themselves to the ten 
principles, advocacy networks can use their position and command of 
information “to expose the distance between discourse and practice.”116 
Such groups will not accept participants’ “Communications on Progress” at 
face value; they will scrutinize them and apply severe pressure in the event 
that a high profile company fails to live up to its commitments.117 Despite its 
voluntary status, the Compact is able to rely on watchdog organizations such 
as Corpwatch and Dissident Voice to employ the naming and shaming 
strategies we have already referred to.118 For example, the online publication 
Multinational Monitor publishes a notorious annual list of the ten worst 
companies in that year.119 Appearing on that list is a public relations 
nightmare for any company and something to be avoided at all costs. 
Overall, therefore, we argue that the Compact has moved from a low to a 
slightly more moderate “delegation” score.  
CONCLUSION  
As we have endeavored to illustrate, clear benefits exist in starting an 
international regulatory mechanism at the softer end of the legalization 
spectrum. Once a broad participation base has been secured and the norms 
generated have become widely accepted and legitimized, the initiative can 
then shift up the legalization spectrum without overly alienating its 
participants. Critics who scoff at the Compact’s “soft” initial approach and 
argue that harder law mechanisms should have been imposed from the outset 
seem to ignore the harsh truth that companies simply would not agree to be 
bound like this. Nor would there have been any opportunity for the 
Compact’s norms to have been developed and refined to the degree of 
precision that they have been. It is likely, therefore, that the Compact would 
have failed at the first hurdle.  
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The Compact at its inception can be likened to a mountain biker at the 
start of his or her journey. The gears on the bike represent the legalization 
spectrum; first gear is prototypical soft law and sixth gear is prototypical 
hard law. Mountain bikers cannot start their journey in sixth gear; there is 
insufficient momentum to propel them forward, so they make little or no 
progress. A far more effective technique is to move up steadily through the 
gears as progressively more momentum is generated. In gradually hardening 
its regulations as participation in the initiative increased and as precise 
norms developed, this is precisely what the Compact’s strategy has 
accomplished. It has shifted from an extremely soft initial position on all 
three scales- obligation, precision and delegation- to a more moderate stance 
that provides the most effective means of attaining its objectives. Its strategy 
is an instructive template to other soft law initiatives, and can be 
summarized in the diagram below: 
 
We are certainly not holding up soft law as the ideal means to ensure 
effective collective action on CSR- its limitations have been well articulated 
by critics and have also been raised in this article. Detailed research is 
necessary to explore the extent to which soft law initiatives such as the 
Compact have actually succeeded in changing the day-to-day operating 
practices of the companies regulated, beyond the rhetoric of annual company 
reports. In a perfect world, businesses would be legally bound to engage in 
ethically sound practices from the outset. However, this article does attempt 
to temper the criticism of soft law by making the case for its immense value 
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to initiatives such as the Compact. In this context, soft law should not be 
seen as merely “a poor relation of hard law.” On the contrary, in many 
instances it is deliberately and consciously selected as the most effective 
means available to achieve a desired objective.120 Despite the obvious 
limitations of a softer approach, any project designed to foster collective 
international action must ensure that it attracts a sufficient participation base 
and takes the time to develop a sufficiently precise normative framework. 
Only then should it begin to tighten the regulatory screw on its participants.  
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